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chapter i

"Whatever one's appraisal of Harry Truman as
President, he commands admiration for his indomitable courae:e through the election ye ar . On the
other hand, what happened to Dewey is a classic
example of what the Greeks call hubris , the pride
before the fall. Yet, there is no room for anyone to t hrow scorn or dirision. All ssw through
the rlass darkly in 1948 . Circumst ances contrived
a gigantic comedy and pulledall lilte puppets . One
can almost hear Puck in the wings, ' What fools
these mortals be.' The experience should be a sobering reminder of human fallibil1ty . 11 1
As election day in 1948 drew nearer, political
pollsters, pros and amateurs united in predicting victory for Thorna.s E, Dewey.

Only underdcg candidate Pres-

ident Truman and, aa it turned out, the American elector2

ate

disa~reed

with t his consensus.

At t he end of 1947 Truman was ccnsidered certain
for renomination by his party, and the Gallup Poll
ahm.,ed that he would easily defeat either of the two
leaaing Reuublicana--Governor Dewev and Senator Ta ft.
A get- tough policy with Russia had pushed up his populari.ty--the IVlarshall l?lan, his advoc acy of gevernment
acti on to curb hign prices, his confrontation with labor
leader ,John L. Lewis which ended in a Truman victory,
all had boosted his popularity.

The '47 November elec-

tiona had broup·ht favorable omena, after the devastating
defea~

in the Congressional elections of '46, with Deru-

ocra.ts \rllnl'ling many loeal elections.

On November 7

-2-

poll tical commentator David La,wrence said,
are less

th~n

11

1'he che.nces

even that the Republ icans wlll wln in 1948

no matter whom the Republicans select a,s their candidate. 11
But with in four months univer sal pessimism had set
in.
v1as

Truman was considered a certain loser, and there
a strong dr1 ve to deny h i m renominat ion.

Never has

the political stock of a President fallen with such
4
liehtening rapidity.

3

-3chapter 11

There is a quality of drama to Truman ' s life
story .

He had been lifted from relative obscurity to

the Presidency by the unpredictable processes of Vice
Presidential selection and the death of FDR.
Harry Truman was born on May 8 , 1884 ln Lamar ,
Missouri.

His father was a fa,rm er and a mule trader.

Harry never got beyond high school, owing to a financial disaster t 1 a t befell his father.

He worked as a

timekeeper, a bank clerk and returned to the family
farm a t age twenty-two .

He was fond of playinr the

piano , reading history , the Nasonic Lodge and National
Guard drill.
fortable rut .

World War I

d1slod~ed

him from his com-

Captain Trwnan discovered in France,

1918 that ho could command men , and he cPme out of the
5
war with new found self-con fi dence .
After the war Truman married Bess WaJlace and
invested in a haberdashery that was forced to close
during the depression in 1922 .

He t hen turned t o pol-

itics under the sponsorship of the powerful Penderr.aet
organization.

The Pendergaets' needed a candidate for

county judge of' Jackson County, Missouri .

They chose

Truman t o run, and he won the general election with
ease .

He now had a $3 , 000-a-year ,l ob and a new career.

Two years later he was defeated--the only elector al
defeat in his career--but made a comeback in 1926 when
he was elected presidinf judRe .

He served in this

-4--

capacity for eig1lt years and earned a r eputation for
being a c onscientious official and an honest one--a
6
rare distinction in that urea.
Truman was :Just a small cor in the Fendergast
machine .

He always main tained that Tom Pendergast

never asked him to do a dishonest deed, but his reputation suffered f rom guilt by association--a loyal
association with one of the mos t corrut.)t poll tical
machines in the country.
needed a senatorial

In 1934 the Pendergasts'

candidate.

'l'hey finally turned

to Judge 1'ruman who was eac:er for the chance, fought
7
hard and won.
In Washington 'rruman was lmown as " the Senator
:Vrom Pendergast."

It was a very painful situation

for him since no ome judged him on his ability
only on hi a baclcground.

~t

He was largely i gnored.

Even

though he had quietely brol"en with Tom Pendergast, he
refused to turn his back on his friends or to sppear
weak by stabbing the people who helped him.

Truman voted

straignt New beal and e reatly admired FDR; but the White
House held him at arm's length because of the Pendereast
Truman did not know it, but FDR was
8
out to break Penderga st.

aroma around him.

By the time Truman came up for re-election in 1940,
Tom .Penderr:.a st was in jail.

FDR sent a messGge to Truman

that if he did no t care to run for re-election, he'd be
glad to e;i ve hill a seat on the Interstate Co.,,merce Commision.

Ilir.

Roosevelt said he didn't th:t11llt M.r . Truman should

-5care to run.

9

i".r . Truman thou c; ht he should l

However, FDH 1 s offer

was a measure of how far the errand boy had come ; it was a
considerable show of' recognition from the man who didn't
even want to meet him fou r years earlier , and was now will ing
to take the trouble he 1 d g-et for e-iving a good appointment
to the notorious henchman of T. J. tendergast . 10
The
own.

fender~ast

With

mea~er

machine was in ruins; Truman was on his

funds and a hastily improvised

he won the primary over FDR 1 s man by only 7 , 600
waa the triumph of the

underdo~

or~anization

votes ~

It

and a foretaste of 1948.

He ran on his record, as he was a,lways point to run - the
record said that Har·ry was an honest man .

It became clear

from this election that Harry Truman had been running for
Himself for a lone time - since way back in 1922 when he
ran for county judee. 11
l t

wa.s in hie second term that Truman made his mark

as a senator by chairinp: the ''Truman Commi ttee 11 , an ad-hoc
committee established ln 1941 to inve stigate the national
defense pror ram .

This committee was a cone:rc ssional con-

science and auditor of the entire war production program
crusading against bureaucratic w·aste of all kinds.

By the

time Truman resigned as chairman in 19ll4, it had sa:ved the
taxpayers over fifteen billion dollars. 12
The conunl ttee gave Tru man the sort of reputation which
leads to a lifetime Senate seat.

Bu t in

~a y,

194~

a Southern

revolt against Vice President Henry Wallace, who was reFarded as too left-wing, caused th e Presi dent to accept a

-6new running mate.

Truman emerged aa the choice .

He was

an excellent selection for he had an impeccable New Deal
record, he was acceptabl e to the South and in good standing with labor, was something of a hero as a war investigator and he had no enemies.

13

Less than three months after Truman took office as
Vice Presid£: nt, Roosevelt suffered a cerebral hemorrhage .
The death of Roosevelt catapulted Truman into that elite
circle of thirty-thre e men who have held the of fice of
President,

But Trurnan was unprepared; FDR had not groomed

any man to be his successor .

Truman had to conclude

America ' s participation in World War II and help establ ish peace.

He was confronted with occupation problems

in Germany, Austria and Japan and i'tas totally unfamiliar
with Roosevelt's secret understandings with Churchill and
Stalin .

Within the year he was called upon to ride the

swift current of irritated public opinion flowing out of
14
America's readjustment to peacetime.
As Truman himself
said :
11

I felt that I had lived five lifetimes in my
first five days as President. I was beginning to
realize how little the Founding Fathers had been
able to anticipate the preparations necessary for
a man to become President so suddenly. l t is a
mighty leap from the Vice President to the Presidency when one is forced t o make it without warning . Under the present system a Vice President
canno t equip himself to become President merely
by virtu e of being second in ranl{." 1 5
While the nation mourned FDR's death, Truman enjoyed a. honeymoon with Cone;ress as with the country.
At one point President Truman had a

~ reat er

popularity

-7with the American public tban did Roosevelt or Eisenhewer.

Yet he war more often a minority than a majority
16

President in public opinion polls.
Truman was swept along by the momentum of things
started under Roosevelt.

Shortly after he took office,

an international gathering at San Francisco began to
draft the charter for the United Nations.
Germany collapsed.

On I>1ay 8, 1945

Just as he was about to discuss

Germany's fate at Fotsdam, he was informed that the
United States now had a successful atomic bomb.

Truman

promptly issued a decree for Japan to unconditionally
surrender or f a ce utter destruction.

A new era in war-

fare opened when Truman ordered the atomic bomb dropped
on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.

Japan surrendered less
17

t han five months aft er he took office.
Disenchantment, when it came, was gradual and it was
both personal and political.

As .President, Truman se.:.:med

hopelessly mi s cast, l a cking the dignity or charm of hie
able predecessor.
mayed

ot ~ers,

His personality delighted some, dis-

but the main concern was over the way he

faltered and fumbled under the weight of responsibility.
" ••• the plain people still liked Harry Truman as
a plain man, but he was not a President who imspired
their high confidence and enthusiastic admiration ••••
A great many of the U. S. people felt sorry for h,im." 18
Truman 1 s method for handling the railroad strike in
May, 1946 enraged his labor supporters and left many citizens wi th s erious doubts concerning his jud8ement .

After

months o1' deadlocked negotiations, a nationwide railroad
strike was called.

A crisis atmosphere developed for the

-8coal mines wel"'e also on strike, and the country had recently been harassed by a massive strike wave in steel and
19
other industries.
Truman spol<: e to the leaders of the
railroad unions saying :
'' If you think I'm going to sit here and let you tie
up this whole country, your crazy as hell. "
11

We've got t o go through wlth it, Mr. President,"

Whitney said .

"Our men are demanding it."
Truman g ot up from his dest . "All ri ght, I'm going

to g ive you the gun.

You've got just 48

h ours-~until

Thursday at this time--to reach a settlement.

If you

don 1 t I'm going to t ake over the railroads in the name
20

of the government."
I n a dramatic appearance before a joint session of
Cdmgress, Truman demanded the right to draft strilcens
into the army whenever national safety was imperiled .
During his speech he was informed that an agreement had
been reached, but he stuck. to his legislative proposal.
Thi s incident was probably Truman's most rash and potentially dungerous acts as President.

It did JDU.t a shine

on Truman's l mae:e as a tough , de termined, "to-hell-wit hwhere-the-chips-may- fall fighter for what he believed was
r i ght. ''

This eventually aided him in 1948 when labor

finally came back to his corner.
21

But for now he lef t

#

l abor cold .
As the 1946 congressional elections approached,
Truman had· been in off ice nineteen months .

He had pre-

sided over the f inal victory in the war, but t he mood

* see

illustra tion page 9a

-9of exultation and hope had
end~avor

~radually

faded.

at home--to hold t he line on prices and wages-The cost-of-living index leaped from 76.9

he 11ad failed.

at the end of 1945 to 83 .4 a y ear later
1948.

In his major

a ~d

to 102.8 by

:Price increases brought wage increases which \•rere

preceded by strikes.

Ordinary consumers, caught in the

price squeeze and plagued by shortages of meat, automobiles, housing and other needs turned their irritation on
the most obvious scapegoat--the President and the Demo22
cratic administration .
"Among the members of his own pa.rt;y, 11 the New
York Times reported late in 1946, "the prevailing
a ttitude toward the ~resident is one of simple despair and futility. Most seem to think he has done
the best be could, but that his best simply was not
good enough." 23
As the midterm election campaign warmed up, the
Republicans, with rare genius, sununed up the national
mood providing a focus for resentment with
one of the most

dev~stating

11

Hac1 enough? 11 - -

2~~

campaign slogans of all time.

November S--election day.

When it was over, the

Republicans had talcen control of Conp;ress for the first
time in sixteen years.

The crushing defeat brought more

comfort to Harry Truman than despair .
burdens from the :President's shoulders.

It lifted twin

25

When Truman came to the Presidency he was a moderate
oonserv~:. tive,

but he had inherited a liberal mandate, a

set of llberal advisers and a fe e ling of obligation to
defer to his dead predecessor 's wishes.

Ine scapably,

Truman found himself maldng statements and advocatine;

1roca- see illustration page 9a

~it

-9a-

*
WHO CAN HANDLE STRJ.KES BEST?
Democrats

Republicans

NO Difference

October, 1945

41

31

28

February, 1946

36

36

28

23

46

31

· l· Octol;>er; · 1•946

D~WCRATIC

DECLINE

-1946Congressional Preferences
Democrat

Republican

February

55

45

March

53

47

July

49

51

Ocotber

47

53

November Election

45·.7

54.3

-10-

policies in which he personally did not wholeheartedly
believe.

Therefore , his administration talked out of' the

left side but longed fo r the right so it was bound to
stumble and drag its feet.

26

But With defeait. in 1 946 , the mandate won by Roosevelt
in 1941+ was lifted.

Truman was free to be his own man--

or to be his own :President.
tion he wished.

He could now go in any direc-

Second--the ReEublicans now had the re-

sponsibility of finding solutions for the problema of
poat-\-iar United States .

Truman now had his own scapegoat
27
to use as an excuse when things weren 't going well .
Shortly after the election Truman's fortunes began to
improve .

A new e.nd refreshing f,·'i1uk.

lectual void around the President .

moved into the intelClark Clifford , smart,

able , diplimatic young lawyer from St. Louie had been promoted to the post of legal counsel to the President.
Clifford did not tal k or look like a New Deal liberal,
though he was . and he gradually won Truman's full confidence becoming his chief' speech writer and administrative
28
coordinator.
Truman t col{ a firm line against a strike called by the
United

I~ne

Workers, proposed the policy to aid Turkey and

Greece which became known as the "Truman Doct.rine"--ArneriCa.Yl

Au.ppo-rt for nations everywhere which were rP-siFJtine

Communist pressure--ana launched the Marshall Plan.

These

new v entures displayed Truman for the first time in full
command of the powers of his office.

By

following his own

advisers, Truman was beginnine.: to win back large numbe·rs

-11-

of disaffected voters.

By July, 1947, Dr. George Gallup

released his ne"' poll which found 55 percent of the public
now favored the Democrats in a Presidential election--compared to 47 percent who would have voted for a Democratic
candidate in December, 1946,

Gallup spoke of the Demo-

crats as having executed ' 1a major political feat."
By

29

mid-1947 the Truman administration's policy in

domestic affairs was made clear when Truman vetoed the
T~ft~Hartley

Act which imposed significant restrictions

on the exercise of labor's power in collective bargaining.
This was a. major victory for Truman's liberal advisors
led by Clark Clifford.

Suddenl y Truman emere:ed as the

ohampion of the labor movement little more than a year
after he had demanded power to put the railroad strikers
into the army.
m~jor

This Taft-Hartley veto was the first

step in closing the gap between the inner convic-

tions and public utterances of Harry Truman.

The veto

message was ineffective since Congress passed the law
over Truman's veto .

But t : is restored standing with the

unions made it likel y that they would supyort him in the
30
Presidential election the followi ng year.
It was one of the misconceptions--perhaps a public
relations triumph--of the 1948 Democratic campaign that it
generally gave the impression of being "an improvised,
desperate effort of an embatt led President fighting
single-handedly against over-whelming odds."

31

There is

little doubt about the desperation of the campaign, but
it was not improvised.

The campaign was carefully planned

every step of the way.

The r.teneral lines of strategy were

-12-

drawn as early as autumn of 191.q.

These wer e a basic blue-

print written by Clifford in a lene:thy memorandum on "the
1)011 tics of 194G. 11

Wnen Clifford began h is paper in 1947,

Tr•urnan wo. s not really the underdog; no one had any reason
to predict a Southern revel t and Henry 'iJ'alla.ce had not declared his candida cy .

However, none of those involved in

the project were ove rly optimistic.

The 1946 defeat was

still fresh in their memory; the Republicans had many able
candidates; the UJreat of Henry Wa.llace was obvious.

32

In min-November Cliffol"d present ed Truman with a

~J-

page document--bold and clear in its analysis of present
trends, accurate in

the future, and proposing a

predictin~

course of action for Trtunan to follow for the next tvrelve
months.
It was predicted that Thoma.s E. Dewey would be the
Rewublican candidate; Henry Wa l lace would run on a thirdparty

ticl~e t;

.President Truman could win even with t he loss

of the big Eastern states if he held the South, 1tlest and
labor vote.
Wo:-S

Events confirmed these judgements.

wrong in one prediction .

11

Clifford

As slways, the South can be

considered safely Democratic, and in formulating national
policy, 1 t can be SB.fely i gnored. 11

This ti me the South

simply refused to follow standard procedure.

33

rrruman read the document and ap·reed vii th Clifford's
analysis.

The concept of a bold, uncompromising offensive

with the State of the Union

messa~e

on J'anuar :y 7.

-13chapter iii

Harry Truman's State of the Union message , delievered
before Congress at 1 : 30 P . t·J . January 7, 1 948 , was the openine; r.;un of his reelection campaign that vias to last for ten
months.

This spee ch vras to announce the poll tical program
34
on which the President would campaign.
Clark Cl ifford's

young assistant G-eorge M. Elsey said that the spee ch :
11

• • • must be cont roversial as hell, mt1st state the
issues of the election, must draw the line sharply
between Republicans and Democrats . The Democratic
platforrrJ will stem from it, 'and the election will be
fought on the issues it presents ." 35

The reaction of the Republican dominated Eightieth.
Congress was " extraordinarily chilly . 11

Seven times Truman

paused for applause and there was none.

Democrat Lowell

Mellett wrote:
11

The reception for Har~J Truman was markedly like
that given the Polar explorers by their i mmediate
acudience--a circle of correctly attired penguins. A
few penguins on that day fla t l ed their wings . 11 36
The major thrust of the message dealt with domes tic
i ssues .

Truman reques ted a mult-pronged social program
+

includine expanded social security, health insurance , Federal aid .for education , Federal housing , extended farm
supports , conservation of natural resources and higher
minimum wae;es.

The r·e was also one novel approace wh ich

showed the Truman touch--he proposed that ea.ch taxpayer
should be able to deduct forty dollars from his tax bill
for himself and each dependent .

Simple; uncluttered by
37

fe.ncy mathematics; something every vot er could understt:' nd .

-14~1e

President came out fully clad a New Deal liberal,

and those on the left and right knew the reason--on December 29 Henry Wallace had entered the political picture with
a third party.

Truman's pr ogram v1as designed ln part to

steal the thunder of Wallace 's proeressive party.

38

The Democra ts greeted his speech with something less
than enthusiasm; the Republicans called it "a labored effort
to promise all things to Qll people; 11 ' the press particularly
cri tized the forth dollar tax credi.t as

11

unm1 tiga tedly dem-

agogic ••• explicable as a trasparent political move. "

39

The State of the Union message to Congress designed to
keep the President's program in the headlines.

Truman was

exploiting one of the major benefits Of the Presidential
office during election year--the power to create publicity
just by beinr. the Freaident.

The slogan around the White

House was "hit 'em e very Monday," as Truman gave the Congress
much unsolicited advice.

He issued his economic report;

Reorganizational Plan I of 1948; plan forD waterway that
would link the St. Lawrence River to the sea; a proposal for
curbs on grain used in making ethyl alconol all in the month
of January.

Others from February to March concerned:

c ivil

rights, extension of wartime controls, highway construction,
assistance to Greece and T.u rkey, International Telecommunication Convention, assistance to China, U. B.-participation
in the United Nations, housing , extension of the Reciprocal
Trade Act.

Most 4. f' not all of these ruessa.c es sought to

dramatize the gulf between dynamic, a{fe·ressi ve, Democratic

-15Presidential leadership and a stagnant, partisan, Republican Congress.
By far the most improtant of these messages was the

one on civil rights present ed Februa:ry 2nd.

'I'ruman hEld

established a Presidential Commit tee on Civll Rights in

1946 under the chairmanship of Charles E. Wilson of General Electric .

The committe e's study, "To Secure These

Rights, 11 made a number of drastic recommendations.

On

the basis of this study Truman made ten reco r:Jnendations
to Cong ress:
1 -

enact modern civil rights laws adequate f or the needs
of the day

2 -

legal attack against all forms of discrimina tion

3 -

anti-lynching legislati on

4 -

end to seg regation in interstate commerce

5 -

establishment of a Fair Employment Practices Commission

6 -

etron~er

7 -

rl pht to safety of person and property

8 -

self-gove rnment for the District of Columbia

9 --

establishment of a per manent Commission on civil rights

10 -

elimination of discrimina t i on in federal employment and
40
segreeation of the a rmed forces .

protection for the right to vote

This Presidential paper 1tras remarkable for it.s scope
'

Even FDR fiad never gone this far to aid Ne-

and audactiy.

groes; h e being politician enough to realize its fullest
41

implications .
· There v-ra s an immedi a t e ro ar of indignation from the
''ig:r.l.Orable" South.

Repres entative Sam Hobbs accused the

President of a desire ·"to keep t he South a conqu er ed pro-

-16vince," and Representative Eugene Cox said, "Harlem is
wielding more influence with the Administration than the
entire whi te South ."

Senator John Connally of Texas said
42
that it was a "lynchine of the c onstitution ."
The President expected these repercussions and had
announced his civil rights stand early in the year to give
Southern tempers a chance t o cool off .

Insteod he added

fire to the already simmering pot of Southern revolt.

At

the Conterence of Southern Governors in Wakulla Sprin3s,
Florida, the following \'leek, the revolt was given a chance
to gather momentum.

They eventually adopted a forty-day

cooling-off period.

But it was becoming obvious that

something serious was in the works .

Senator Eastland of

Mississippi, labeling Truman a "carpetba,ggPr ," de clared,
11

All we have to do is to refuse to vote t he ticket ••••

By withholding the e l ectoral

votes, the South can defea t
43

in 1945 any Democrati c candidate ."
In order to placate the dissident Southerners,
'I'ruman quitely backed away from initiating action to ge t
his civil rights legislation passed.

Hls two executive

orders on federal employment and the problem of the armed
forces were not released until after t he stormy Democratic
Convention.

Truman did everything possible, short of going

back on his February 2nd speech, to keep
.lj.4

t~ e

Dixiecrats in

the party.
Another serious blow came to the Democrats a few days
after the civil rights message when the question concerning
the extent of support for Henry Wa llace was answered.

On

-17F~bruary

17th in a special election for Congres s held in the

24th Congressional District of the B:flonx, supposedly a stronghold of' Democratic boss Ed Flynn , the American-Labor candidate
Leo Isacson, backed by Henry Wallace, trounced his Democratic
and Liberal opponents by a two to one margin.

This indicated

that Wallace's strength could cost the Democrats New York and
other Eastern states in the Presidential election.

Wallace

had campaigned in the district which was 35% Jewish saying,
"Truman talks J ewish but acts Arab. 11

Al though the Illnited

Nations , under pressure by the United States, had passed
throu gh a resolution for partition of Pal estine on November
29, the United States had then issued an arms embarge on
December 5.
being :killed.

Jews and Arabs were now

fi~hting

45

with hundreds

Under this cloud of prevailing doom , the Democratic
Party held its annual Jefferson-Jackson

Da~

dinner with the

distinguished guest for the evening beine; President Truman .
The atmosphere waa grim.

Senator Olin Johnson of South

Carolina had reserved an entire table right unde r· the eyes
of the Fresident , then sent an aide to make sure the table
remained vaca:o t .

They spent #1 , 1.00 t o lteep that table vacant

r e fusing to attend on the ground that since no segregation
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was enforced they might have to dine wi th Negroes.
The absence of prominent Southerners was very noticeable.
There were fund-raising dinner parties throughout the South ,
as usual, but little if any of the proceeds found the ir way
to the Democratic National Conmittee .
Laney tool\. a vote

a·~

At Little Rock Governor

to whether the funds should be retaiad

in Arkansas as a protest

a~ ainst

tte President ' s civil

ri~~ts

-18program .

The chairman c&lled the vote a tie and referred

the money to the party's state committee .

Soon afterward ,

when Harry 1 Truman 's dlnner speech was relayed from

Washin;~ ton,

about 400 diners {750 present) got to t heir feet and quietly
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l eft t he room.
I f ever there was an office-seelcin6 pol l tici an w1 th

the chips stacked a gainst him , it was Harry Truman--donothinc;-right-Truman in those first months of 194-8.

Late in

February he took a break and went on a two weelc Caribbean
cru.ise,

This break and O'bhers greatly aided Truman since

they brake the oppressive continui ty of growing hostilities
and ga.ve time for h is natural self-confidence and optimism to
recuperate .
fight .

He returned loolcing Tan, rested and ready to

~io ilday,

lvlarch 8th , he called Dentocratio National

Co'timittee Chairman Senator McGrath to his office.

A little

lat er McGrat h , wi t J1 a h i nt of a smi le, wallced into a swarm
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of reporters in t he White House lobby.
11

The President," he told them, "has authorized me to

say that if nominated by the Democratic Natlonal Convention
4·9

he will accept and r un ."
By the end of March Tru.nan' s p opul arity had hit rock

bottom.

He had retreated from h is position calline for

partitionllmrr Pale s tine and adopted the i dGa of t l::e temporary
positi on of trusteeshi p .
sel l - out.

To the liberals t his was a complete

Max Lerner voiced

t~is

sentiment for many:

11

0ne

VTOuld have to [:O be ck to I"lunich t o recall a sell-out as cynical,
as bedraggled , as contemptible •• • •

A man had t o have a genhs

for blundering to have dome so complete a job of s t .rip;.ing

-19himself of the support of so many varied groups. ' 1 50
The Democrat ic leaders could see their str• nge conglomeration of support bases l>eing pulled apart.

The party

was an amalgam of a conservative South, a progressive, organized labor move1nent , bi13-ci ty mo.chines, moderates, liberals, i dealists, radi cals , Jews and now Negroes--all fused
together by the political genius of Roosevelt and torn apart
by the particularly apt blunde ring of Trumm.n .

The conviction

that Truman was a dee.d duc k was due basically t o t he fixed
i dea tha t political analysts had b e en proclaiming for some
time--that the dl nsolut ion of the Roosevelt c oalition wa s
inevitable.

To a large extent t he decline in Truman's

poll tical strength was this sophistice.ted poti tical thirJcing
becoming ingrained in the public psychology.

Time and again

political analysts wrote that anly t he war enabled Roosevelt
to hold his coalition together i n
to challenge or substantiate .
belie f

194l~--an

idea impossible

There is something to the

i f you say something aften enough, loud enough
51
people begin to believe it.
tr~ t

I n t he da rk days of the spring of 19il-8 Tru man was
urged to withdraw .

The belie f in t he certainty of Truman's

doom l ed to the most bizarre development of a rather bizarre
campaign--the e ff ort to draft General Dwight D. Ei senhower
in place of Truman.

(It has been reported t hat Truman offe red

t o withdraw if Eisenhower would consent to run with Truman
as the Vice Presidential candida te.
General Eisenhower

aimpl~

·rruman de11ies this, and

says that a.ny

should come from Truman or not at all.)

t=~f f l rmation

on t his

By the end of March

-20-

the rebelllon was e r upting in all parts of th o nation .
However , Eis·enhower was not inte rested in recei vinp the nomina tion , a r. d the rebellion gradually died .
worried about being denied renomination .

Truman W<. s nev e r
He kne\.,r tha.t to

a great degree the man sittlng in the 'N hite House controlled
his party 1 s C·-·m vention throu gh nomine: the chairman, patronage which g ives c ontrol of party machinery dov-rn to the lowest
precinct worker t hus e nabl ing tbe :President to corral c onvention delegates, and U.1e belief' that to dump the party's
leade r, ther eby repudiating the r e cord of the party, is very
dangerous .

Once Truma.n hDd decided t o run there \'las little

that could be done to prevent renomin a tion .
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chapter iv

The central theme of the President's campaig,n in 1948
was his vendetta with the Repub1ican dominated Eightieth
Coneress.

This

~sa

convenient piece of fiction contrived

out of thin alr uy a mas t er politician .

Truman understood

that the people have a distrust for their elected legislative body and are ready to blame them
ills of the

time~

his scapegoat.

collect ~ vely

there fore, he made the Eightieth

for the
6~ngress

He i mpressed the people with his idea that

the President and Vice Fresldent are the only two persons
elected b:,r the whole country and repreoent all the people .
The members of Cong ress, on the other hand, are electt:""d by
sectional or special interest

~ r oups.
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The explosion aga inst the Ei Ehtie th Cong ress came
suddenly in June .

F'o:v the first five months of the session

thEir were no signs of any unusual bad feelings between t he
Fre sident and the Cone;ress; only the usual friction on domestic affairs.

The President set off on June 3rd in the

Presidential Special for a cross-counnry trip to accept an
honorary dee-ree at the Uni ve1"si ty of Cali fornia.

This en-

abled him to list the trip as "non-:-poli tical" A.nd to have
it paid for by the ree:ul ar treasury r ather than by the i mpoverished Democratic National Committee.

Congress v1as to

adjourn June 1 S'th and Truman was cri ticizecl for ta.kine; "a
self-servi ng . politi ca.l vacation at a moment when the whole
Government should be on the job in washlncton . 11
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Truman stopped for ma jor addresses, containing hl3
personal message to the people, in five key cities and
made many off-the-cuff rear-pl l:.ttJform spf)eches .
11

jauntily announced that he was on hiB way
a de gree ."

Truman

fur to get me

Having established the non-political pretext
11

for his trip , he got dO\'In to his personal message:
is juot one bir issue .

TherEJ

It is the special int erests against

t he people, and tbe President being elected by all the
people."

Of course, the Republican Party in general

and the Republican-controlled Eightieth Cone;ress in particular represented the special interests.

11

You 1 ve got the

worst Congress in the Unlted States you've ever had .

If

you \vant to continue the policies of the Eightieth Congress,
1t 1 11 be your funeral . 11
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Truman kept blazing away , the cl"owds were hugh and
enthusiastic, local politiciams told him that he day struck
fire.

He had taken the

positio~

of the fir.hting champion

of the people aeainst special interests .

The first shouts of.

''Give' eJ.Il hell, Harry l" were heard on this trip, and this
soon

bec~ne

the battle cry of the Democratic campaign .

Truman said t he cry was originated by some roan in Serttle
with a big volce.

Truman declared , "I told him at that ti me,

and I have been r epeatlnr it ever since,
deli b e7'a tely gi ven anybody hell.

tt~t

I have never

1 just tell the truth on

the opposition--and they thinlc 1 t' s hell . 11
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Senator Taft protested bitterly, as did most Republlcana , tbe spectacle of the President heaping hell-fire and
brimstone on the Cone:re ss at the federal expense.

"The

-23President , 11 said Taft,

11

is

black~uardlng

every whistle station in t he country."

the Co ngre s s at
With this Taft

colned the term used to de s cribe Truman' s campaign-"whistlestopping."

He also managed to wound the civic pride of

every place the President had spoke.
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The President was highly satisfied with his tri p .

As an

extemporaneous speaker he inspired the crowds as hiEJ prepared
apee ched c ou ld neve r do .

He established t he free-swine l ng

style he was to use in later campai gn trips.

Once Trumat1

cawe out as his ovm man aft er 1946, he gr edually, t h ough
blundel"ine: at times, let his na tural poli tical instincts
take over .

He believed in the people as strongly as he held

the Congres s, Party leade rs and press in contempt.

You

might s ay he decided to "te ll it lilre it isl" -this was
something t he people could unde rstand.

chapter v

As Truman slid

do~mhill,

the battle for the Repub-

lican nomination seemed to be all import ant since whomever won would obviously be t he next President.

The strug-

gle for the nomination is t he story of the rise and fall
of Harold Stassen .
vigorous, yo•J.ng
been elected .

Many Republicans believe th "' t if t he

St as ~·en

had been nominated, he would have
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The leading candidu te-.r were Governor Thomas E. De'tvey
of New York, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio and underdog
Harold Stassen . Dewey was the sweetheart of the liberal
fa c t i on of the Party .

He had r i sen to prominence in t he

1930 ' s as a rack et-busting district attorney in New York

City .

In 1942 DeHey was t he f i rst Re_p1..1blican in twenty

years to win the goveJ· norship of New York .

He established

a reputation as a mode cate econowically and socially with
a t alent for effi cient management.

In foreign affairs he

was an advocate of the United Nations .

He 1tron the Repub-

lican nomination in 1944- without actively aampai e;nin{j for
it .

He could not defeat the electorate ' s reluctance to

turn out Roosevelt an Comma nder-inChief durln5 wartime ,
but did make a good sho'WinE .

He was returned to the g over-

nor ship of New York in t 946 by an impressive victory.
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However, Dewey was not a dramatic or compelling candidate.

Many found his manner cold and smug .

Time mag-

izine wrote of Dewey that he was '' to mechanistically 1)re
cise to be l i ked, to wat chfully unbending to be confided,

-25too coldly ambltious to be loved ."

But Dewey had a rich

baritone voice, perfect for radio .

He was clean ct1 t , well

groomed and combined youthful v i e:or i'li th u kea.n sense of
political awareness .

The liberals fe l t he was perfect for

the mood of the country - -a mood wh ich they felt showed
tiredness with the brash Democrats and rea.dy for a change
for the cool steadiness of Dewey .
60
mi scalculation .

This was their ereat

Stubbornly opposed to the Dewey force o was the conservative Old Guard of the G. O.P .

I~s

roots workers who kept t he

together qetween national

~y

members were the grass-

elections, and their champion in 1948 was Robert Alphonso
Taft of Ohio.

Taft had eme r eed as a skillful political

t actician and a fortl1ldable polit ical figure .
actual leader of the Party in the Senate.

He was t he

Taft had come to

symbolize thrift, honor, patriotism and other virtues they
were clinging to in order to keep their sanity during the
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two previous decades of bewilderine and fe ~ rful change .
Taft was a shy , dour- faced man almost totall y wi t hout
personal magne tism • . His comu1ents on controve rsial issues
were usually to bluntly honest and politically ill - considered .
For insta.nce , in 1947 when food proces \'/ere slcyrooketine he
advised the American people to "eat less ."
62
he was the most seri ous threat to Dewey.

Neve:r"theless,

The fact that t he Republicans had two lea.din(! candidates
opened the door for the emergence of a compromise darkhorse- Harold Stassen .

After Dev1ey won the New Hampshire primary

in early .I11.1.arch , Stassen came to the front .

In the first

-26big primary in Wisconsin on April 6 , Stassen pulled off a
surprise, overwhelming victory over favorite son General
Douglas MacArthur.

Stassen then moved hie very effective

organization into Nebraska where the three leaders campaigned vigorously.

Here Stassen won again.

In the pri-

mary in Pennsylvania where no candidates were entered,
Stassen received enough write-in votes to win.

SUddenly

the Gallup Poll had done a flip-flop, and Stassen pulled
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ahead of Dewey.
$tassen had captured the imagination of the public.
The reasons for his tremendous success are the man himself-he was

youn~,

ln 1938

only forty-one, and appealed to the young .

he had sta,rtled the nation when at thirty-one he was

elected governor of Minnesota.

After wartime service ln the

Navy, he returned to the political scene .

His enthusiasm,

drive and physical appearance radiated strength , purpose
and decisiveness,

He attrac ted

y oun~

lieutenants with ded-

6~

lcated zeal.
Stassen declared his candidacy for the Fresidency

~n

1946 and launched a campaign that tttas to cover 160 ,000 miles
in forty-two states.

As a midwesterner, Stassen appealed

t o the conservatives; he was an internationalist reflecting
the liberal temper of the times.

lie seemed as bold and

forthright as the title of his book Where 1 Stand.

In the

age of anxiety when there was a deep distrust of politicians ,
Stassen came forth as a new, unorthodox, forceful personality
who had the self assurance
the times.
take a.

to cope with the problema of

His chances looked good , but t hen came the mis-

-27Stassen's drivinF." ambition caused his first mistake-pitting himself ar.ainst 1'aft in the Ohio primary on May 4th .
Taft told Stassen honestly that Stassen could not win in
Taft's home state, but Stassen took the advice as a sign
of weakness.

By the time St:ssen saw his mistake it was

too late.

Taft won the primary, and Stassen lost valuable
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tlme from campaigning in Oreeon.
Dewey knew the improtance of Oregan, where another
Stassen triumph would almost assure Stassen the nomination.
Dev1ey was takin13 no chances this time but campaigned lone;
and hard.

Now it

W;-:~S st ~· ssen ' s

making a crucial error .

turn to panlc, and he did

He challene-ed Dewey to a debate

on whether the Communist Party should be outlawed.
eagerly accepted,

Dewey

His courtroom experience had been ex-

cellent training for such an encounter, and 1vhile the voters
around the country listened on t heir radio Dewey tore Stassen's
argulJ1ents to bits.

Dewey won the primary a.nd greatly en-

hanced his prestige nationwide.
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More than 2,000 deleeates and alternates gathered at
Philadelphia on June 21st and watched tt:e dawn of a new
political

a~e--tele vision

had arrived.

However~

its limited

scope caused little change in the 19LI·8 conventions.

The

major decisions vvere still made in smolce-fil led back rooms,
and only the

11

ins1ders 11 felt lilce it was a high-spiti ted.

convention.

To all outward appearances the Republicans
68
suffered from boredom within.
Dewey arrived at Philadelphia with 350 votes, gathered
in the primaries and behind the scenes .

He only needed 200

-28votes to secure his nomination.
De~tey

had a highly efficient organization.

While

Stassen and Taflb were bickering among themselves, Dewey's
men were out wheedling, cajoling and promising--or at least
seeming to promise--in order to get the uncommitted delega tes .

One state after another wavered and, fearful of

being bypa s sed by the Dewey bandwap:on, panicked and climed
aboard.

As a result, on the first ballot Dewey had 434

votes , just 114 short of the needed majority.
224 votes and Stassen 157 .

~aft

had

To maintain the psych.ological
~row

pressure Dewey's lead would have to

during the second

round; it did, to 515 votes only 33 short of nomination.

69

Taft pla.ced a desperate call to Stassen saying the only
way to stop Dewey was if Sts.ssen released his dele gates to
Taft.

Stassen said he would on the

fot~rth

ballot, but

by now Taft knew there would be no fourth balkt .

Taft,

Tflea.rily, scribbled a few lines and sent the note to Ohio
Senator John Bricker, who had placed Taft's name in nomination.

Ju st before the third ballot began, Bric ker read

'raft ' s messare to the convention :

"Dewey is a great Repub-

lican, and he will make a e.:reat Republivan President ."
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Within a matter of minutes the other candidates also
bowed out, and on the third ba llot Dewey becarue the party 's
choice.

Dewey entered the hall and began his acceptance

speech with :

11

1 come to you unfettered by a single obli-

gation or promise to any livin£5 person. "

(The delegates who

lcnew o:r the intensi-ve pre-balloting bargaining being done
by Dewey's lieutenants were stunned.

They soon found out

-29
that Dewey meant that, at lea st on the Vice Fresidency,
whatever promisee his aides might he.ve made or implied
would not be binding on him.)
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At 4 A. M. Dewey, after having conferred all evening
with party leaders, called Earl Warren to his hotel and
offered him the Vice Presidency.

Warren had turned Dewey

down in 1944, but he could not do so again and still retain
his standing in the party.

After receiving Dewey's promise

to invest the Vice Presidency with meaningful responsibility,
Warren ac reed to run .

Thus, the Republicans offered the

electorate the governors of the two richest and most populous
states.

Warren's good-natured warmth nicely complemented

Dewey's brisk, chilly manner,

The Republican's had come up
72
with a very strong ticket to do ba l.tle with a "gone goose."

-30chapter vi

The stage was set.

'l'he Democrntlc Party was f30in.g to

commit suicide just so Harry B. Truwan could run for President .

The convention opened in Philadelphia, on July 12th.

and it lo Jked like a massive funeral gathering.
The first night , however, the Democratic Party caught
fire, and the man who struck the match was Senator Alban
Bark1w of Kentucky , convention keynoter .

Barkley, long

the Democratic leader of the Senate, a t seventy was one of
the party's staunchest bulwarks and most colorful orators.
He spolte for sixty-eight minutes announcinr. :
" ~'le have assembled here for a e-rea t purpose .
We
are here to give the American people o.n accounting of
our stewardship in the administration of thei r affairs
for sixteen outstanding eventful years, for not one
of which we make an apology. "

The delegates, suddenly roused from their l ethargy ,
cheered.

Barkley' later spoke of Dewey's promise to eliminate

the cobwebs from the federal gov ernment .

ul am not an expert on cobwebs, but if my memory
does not betry me, when the Democratic Party took over
the g overnment of the United Sta tes sixteen years ago,
even the spiders were so weak from starvation they
could not weave a. cobweb in any department of the
government. '1 73
~fuen Bark~

finished, a twenty-eight minute demonstra-

tion bvoke out on t he floor.

Few demonstrations of that

duration are without advance planning, b'Ult there vras nothing
synthetic about the afl.ection displayed for Barkly.
moment he hao blotted out the frustrati ons of
back the clock to the golden era of Roosevelt.
was the Vice Presidential nom l nation.
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1 9~ 8

For one
and turned

His rewa r d

-31Truman had wanted to bolster the ticket with a youngish
New Dea ler, an.c'l his first choice had been Justice William
0. Douglas .

However, Douglas turned him down .

This threw

the Vice Presidency open, and when Barlt]ey' s speech made h im
the party's hero, Truman had to acce pt him.
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Before the convention closed , 'I'ruman received a.nother
surprise.

He had hoped t o minirulze the friction between

southe rn and not-thern wings by having the platform committee
adopt a mild plank on civil

r~ghta.

The committee

a ~re ed

over protestati ons of liberals led by Hubert H. Humphrey,
the outspoken young

ma~or

of Minneapolis who wa s running

for the Senate, and \'lho came into national prominence at
this time .

~1en

the platform reached the floor, Humphrey

pr esented a minority report calling for the adoption of a
stronper civil-rights plank .

Humphrey orated, "I say the

time has come to walk out of the shadow of stutes' rights and
l nto the sunlight of

hl l ffiBn

rights • 11

The vote was a sensa-

tional upset with 651t for to 582t a gainst.

Thirty-five

delegates from Mississippi and Alabama walked out of the
convention in protest.

In his memoirs, Truman cites an ex-

change between a rltlewsman and South Carolina's Governor J.
Strom Thurmond.

"President Truman is only following the

platform tha t Roosevelt advocated, 11
out.

"I agree, " Thurmond replied .

means it."
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the r eporter pointod
" But Truman re a lly

Next c ame the main order· of business.

The Southerners

remaining t hrew their support to Senator Richard Russell of
Georgia .

But on the first ro •l call Truman got 947J and the

nomination.

Truman began his acceptance speech around 2

A. r~ .

-32He reeled off a long list of Democratic achievements and
again lashed. ovt at the sins of the Republican Conr.;ress.
lie then noted t hat the platform adopted by the Republicans

c~lled

for

le~islation

to remedy the

ho~sing

curb infla.ti on and increase social security.
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shortage,

The Eightieth

Cone:ress had a lready f t) iled to act on these proposal s
therefore:
"On the twenty-sixth day of July, which out in
Missouri we call 1 Turnip Day, 1 I am going t o call
Coneress back and ask them to pass laws to hal t rising
prices , to meet the housing crisis--which they are
saying t hey are for in their paltform. Now, my friends,
if there is any ~ eality behind that Republican plat form
we ought to see some actlon ·ou.t of a short session of
t he Eightieth Congress. They aam do this job in fifteen
days if they want to do it . They wll l still have time
to run for office . . . . rtlha.t the worst r.:1ghtieth Con rees
does in its special session will be t he t Pst •• • • The
America.:1 people •• ,will decide the r e cord . 11 79
Truman was gambling that the Republican leadership
would not push through his

prop~s ed

leGislation and take

As

Clark

Clifford, Truman ' s top political a.dviser , put it:

We ' ve

credit for it.

Bmt he felt he had no choice.

(30t our backs on our own one-yard line eith a minute to

play; it has to be raz zle-dozzle.tt Moreover 7 Truman tvas
really fairly

c ~nfident

that the Republicans would not call

his blurr.
Congress lived up to 'L'ruman 's expectations a nd did
''lo thln_;:

8tit>rJt c.~ nt

t;..J.l abo ut inflation, the housing shortage,

civil rir ht s or a.ny other' problems.
lat er, Conf ress went home
80
ammu.niticn for Truman .

l ea vin~

Less than t\·Jo weeks

behind a fr e sh su pply of

-33chapter v..i..i

The ••ignorable" Solid South had had enough.

On Sa tur-

day, July 17th, Democrats fro ru all over the South and Cali-

formia, Indiana and Maryland met in Birmingham, Alabama.
The

Dixiecrat~

one day convention was a rousi np affair,

but notably absent were the Southe rn politicians of stature .
T he~ef ore,

t he nominations went to the two prime movers ,

Governor J . Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Fieldine;
81

L . wvri£5ht of Mississippi .
Their pl c:. tf'orm said, '' We stand for the segree:a tion of
the race s and the r a cial in:t'egrity of each r a ce."

Thurmond

then so.id)
"We believe that there are not enou gh hoops in the
Army to force the Southern people to admit the Ner:roes
into our theaters, swi 1 ing poofus, and homes •••• If
t he South should vote for Truman tbls yea,r, we might
as wll petition the Government for colonll.al status • • . • " 82
The Southern revolt was

perplcxin~ .

The strong civil

ri e::hts pl a tform wns obviously n ot supported by Truman, a r d
the Southerners must have lmovm this .

Howeve r, tempers had

been rou s ed , and lor ic was no longer in control .
however, \'la s serious .

The revolt,

lt would r(..(pture the Solid South

rrhich was a problem Tru.rnan hsd not prepared for .

All White

:rouse strategy had been bull t on the a ssumption that the
117 electoral votes of the Solid South were in the bae.
83
"Now t he bag was l ea king ."
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Philadelphia. host ed a third political convention beelnning Friday' July 23rd--that of Henry '1'/allace Is Prog ressive Party.

In the same hall used by the Democrats

a.nd Republic t- ns, the FrogrAasives formally nominated Henry
Wallace for President and Democra.tic Senator Glen Tay lor
~
84
of Idaho for Vice President .
Wallace had

se ~med

to be t he spiritual heir of Roose-

velt, and a. real attraction among liberal s .

His progressl ve

stands were considered sure magnets for votes .

Hew.s an

unusual sort of politician--a scientist, a peace advo c ate,
an intellectual, an idealist ana dev.out Christain .
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The ?roJ:"ressi ve Party of r· 1 9L~8 was unique among major
thrid party movements, for it was clearly domina t ed by the
Communist Party.

Moat of the members were non-Communist,

but many w1lllngly collaborated with Communits because they
were to politicall y unsophisticated to recognize one .

Thi s

becawe the largest and most successful electoral effort
even launched by the Communists , because Wallace, though
never a Communist himself, allowed himself t o be use d for
their purposes.
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Wallace broke with Truman over our foreign p olicy
toward Russia. .

He hoped to influence the Truman administration

to1trard a more so operative and understanding position in rega rd
t o the Soviet Union .

Wallac e was more readi ly disposed to

que stion the motives of his own gove rnment tha.n to impue:ne
the sincerity of a forei gn power.

Truman, however, was in

-35no mood to overlook the expanslonest program of Russia, and
the conflict resulted.
Early in 1948 Wallace ' s following appeared to be extens ive .

After the victory of his candida te, Le o Isacson,

in the Bronx 24th Congressional District election, Truman
and his staff recognized him as a threat.

Truman began to

offset Wallace ' s appeal by incorporatinp- Wallace's programs
into his own.

'1111U8 ,

Tt>tunan took action to recoup some of

the damage done when he repudiated the Palestive partition.
Truman blamed the Ste te Department for hls original mistake
and recoe;nized Israel on May 14th eithin minutes a fter it
had beeome a state .

Also, Trnman's civil rights message of

February 2nd, was moti vated by a desire to offset 'Nallace 1 a
87
appeal to the Negroes.
The Wallace movement turned out to be a fiasco in the
end because he could e;et no real supr:ort from l abor .

He

did manage to get en the ballot in forty-four states, but
in order to get enough signatures to do this '1fallace was
88
forced to peak too soon.

-36chapter ix

11

Nice guys don 1 t win bellgames , ·~ Leo Durocher one

observed .

The same is too often true O.L' the game of pol-

itics , and never has thio been more oubstanti ated than in
the :Presidential carnpa.lgn of' 1948.

89

Republican Thomas Dewey made the

11

e;reat miscalculation"

of his political career when he deliberately chose to war.e
a

11

hitrh-leve:1! campaif)n .

His cruupaign eff'ort was as tidy

as a new pln , abundantly financed and organized wlth meticulous efficiency.

The polls , press and politicql ex-

perts told Dewey he could not lose, so he dod not campaign
to win but to set up the gu ideposts of his new administration .

Dewey's rich commanding baritone exuded so much
90
confidence t t1at he put his audiences to sleep .
Democrat _Harry Truman, just as deliberately, chose the
low road--a choice of necessity,

win.

The

.r.~arty

No one believed he c ot ld

treasury was empty, the party orc;anization

was in chaos, and the President was on the

~efensive.

So

he fought with the heedless , slam-bang ferocity of the
underdog who knows there is only one way out--and he set
91
the public's imagination afire .
Late in June Clifford sent a memorandum to Truman say-

11

Thls election can only be won by bold and daring
steps calcul ated to reverse the powerful trend now
runnin~ against us .
The boldest and most popular
step the President could possibly take WOl.Jld be to call
a special session of Congress early .in August. This
would: (1) focus attention on the rotten record of

-37the Eightieth Conf!re ss, trrhich the lepublicans and
the press will try to malte the country fort:'et; ( 2)
force Dewey and Warren to defend the actions of Congress
and make t hem accept Congress as a basic issue; (3)
keep the steady glare of publicity on the Neanderthal
man Of the Republican pa~ty, who will emba ~rass Dewey
and Warren; (4) split the Republicans on how to deal
~,o. ith such major issues as housine , inflation, foreign
pollcy, etc., and (5) give President Truman a chance
to follovl through on the flghting start he made on his
western tour.
This course may be ha.za.rdous poli tioally, but we cannot
s hut our eyes to the f ·~ ct that President Truman !laces
an uphill f lght to win the coming election~· 92
This led to the special sessionof Conr ress which was
a farce, but it dld put the Republicans on the spot .
The Deiltocra tic campaign was geared to attract four
distinct groups--labor, the farmer, Negroes and the consumer.

Truman had predicted tha t the liberals and la.bor

leaders would come back into the fold after t te convention,
and he was right .

They really had no place else to go.

Gerald W. Johnson expressed this sentiment in the

New~

~:

"The great argwnent for the President had no reference - at all to Truman . · It is simply this: Take a
look at t he others. Stacked up against the Archangel
Gabriel, Truman doesn ' t look so EOOd , by stacked u p
against the array opposing him he begins to look like
the Archangel Gabriel. After all. Gabriel is not a
candidate . " 93
The Americans for Democratic Aetion, t he Liberal Party
in New York,

t ~e

International Ladies Garment Workers Unlon ,

and t he Cone:ress of Industrial Organizations all now endorsed
Truman.

His veto of the Taft-Hartley Act and the recognition

of Is;r>ael had payed off .
o~

Wallace .

\'iere

leaning between Truman

Dewey never make an inroad lnto the l abor or
9LI-

lJ.beral vote .

The rest

-38Truman started his campaign with a speech in Detroit .
This was a

11

labor city, 11 and Truman came out with another

vicious attack on the

11

do-nothing 11 Eigl·l tieth Congress and

the Taft-Hartley Ac t they had passed.

Dewey chose to i gnore

Tr1..1.man ' s attack which set the strategy for both men's campalgn .
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After l abor had come baclc to Truman, he turned his
attention to the farmers, who h3d reasons for grumbling .
The basis of the farmer's trouble was the crop surpl us
produced in 1948.
steeply .

Truman

All summer rraln proces had been dropping
mana t~ ed

to blame their troubles on his

right are--the Eightieth Congress .
The farmer , ordinar ily , cot.ld store his surplu s grain
in gove1nment silos until prices rose.
at a profit on the open marltet.

Then he coul d sell

The Commodity Credit Cor-

poration loaned the farmer money on the crops stored .

But in

renewing the · C. C.C.'s authorization in 1948, Congress had
failed to atlthorize the building of any addi tiono.l storap;e
bi ns .

Wben the 1948 harvests came in, the C.C.C . ran out

of storage bins , and the farmers were forced to sel l at. a
low market price .

96

In his first major farm spee ch at Dexter , Iowa, on
September 18 th, Truman sai d :
11

1'his Republican Congress has already stuck a pi tchfork 1n the farmers' back. They have alre~dy done their
best to l..eep pri ce supJ;Orts from work lng . • •• big business lobbyists and speculators persuaded the Conc ress not
to provide storage bins for you farmers . They tied
the hands of the administration. They are preventing
us from setting up the stora~e b i ns that you wil l need
in order to get the support price for your grai n ." 97

-39The farmers , usually a Republican

stron~hold,

were

suddenmy thinlcine: Deruocra tic; Dewey did nothing to stop
this.

But Dewey was at a disadvantt~.e:e--he had been con-

centrating

on

Nert Yor:~

politics for so lone that he knew

very little o.f t he for.111ers' problems.

His advisors were

•lso big city politicians, so there was no one who could
tell him t he wlstake he was making.
remember

nothin~

had said

n~thinF .

The farmers could

Dewey had said precisely because Dewey
98

•.rruman' s election campa ien was mostly two cross-country tours patterned after his ''whl s tlestoppine: " tour of
June.

He was a.t his best

makinf~

at whistle stops alone the way.

brief, impromptu speeches
Their finances were low,

but they manac:ed to turn this to their advantage .

On sev-

eral occasions to dramatize the party's fi nanc ial pl i ght,
Finance Chairman Johnson allowed t he network's to cut the
President off the air before he had finished his speech.
Once, when a net-fork official warned that Truman would be
cut o:f:'f unless the Democrats lJUt up more money .
told

h~m:

"Go ahead .

Johnson

That wi ll tnean another milllon votes."

Dewey also traveled the country in a campaign train
with his staff of experts and advisors.
at

SOq!e of the same places.

attr~:~ctin e·

They even spoke

(But everywhere Truman v1as

bie: er audiences t han Dewey .

Reporters explained

this away by s aying that the voters \'/eY"c. turnlne out to see
President Tru1nan and his family , rat her than
candidate Truman.)

Democratic

Dewey •s big issuet if th ere was one ,

99

-40-

was unity.

nour future and the peace of the world are st.:lked
100

on bow 1.mi ted the people of America are, 11 he proclaimed.
In the interest of unity, Dewey even manaced t o talr:e
11

a tolerant view of Democratic sins.

1 will not contend that

all our difficulties today have been brought about by the
present national administration.

Some of the se unhappy

condidtions are the results of circumstance s beyond the
cnntrol of any government . "

A kindness Truman would never
101

have extended, and a t ab tic the voters found,dull.
The Frogressive Party which had begun with hopes of
waging a populist cru sade t hat would bring support form farm
and labor grot. ps.

But by his a ttac!ts on Republican reaction,

Truman had stol,en most of the issues and rcade the.uJ his own.
Wallace found himself with only one .real issue--peace.
in 1948 what
appeasement.

~/alla. ce

called

W~llace ' ~

pe~ce ,

i3ut

many Americans called

pleas for coexistence with the Soviet

'Lnion were undermined by the evidence of Ru.ssla 's ae:Fressive
intentions;

in February the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia

and the Ber l in blockade in June.

Wallace's refusal to dis-

avow Communist support .and the obviousness of

Co~nmun i st s

and the:i,r sympathizers in the cO'I. .' :ncil s of the Progressive
102

Party smeared his whole campairn with

c.t

Red brush .

'l'he presence of' Henry Wallace was begim ·ine: to pay off
for Harry 1rru '!.an .

The sentiment of the;: country was firmly

behind Ol'f'uman's firm anti-Communist stand and
as the exponent of the Comurunist line .

a~ainst

Wallace

Had 1 t not been for

the ingrained conviction that Trumun didn't stand a chance,
it vrould have been evident t hat the President, by bis a.nti103

Communist s t and , was e:aininc. ground.

-41The Dixiecrat States' Rights campai13n headed by Governor Strom Thurmond had been virtua l l y assured thirtyeight electoral votes from the four Southern states '"here
he had been made the Democra tic Party ' s official candida te.
Thurmond tried to build on thls foundation by
for "raci a l purity" and " st tes ' rights . "

c~mpaigning

He was a moderate

on the race issue and rejected racial extremists such as
Gerald L. K. Smith.

He was a beli ever in the justice of the
104

South's cause and ran a decent campaign .
Thurmond soon fo nd tha,t support was no
find.

thing to

e~sy

t-1ost of the r ewspapers were against him.

Ralph

McGrill of t he Atlantic Constitution wrote, " 'tie vrill pay
throu gh the nose for the Dixiecrats a,s we still pay for the
leadershi p which tool: us into tl1e 1r1e.r betv·men t he Sta tea
to ' save u.s.'

Is Harry Truman immortal? "

Practical south-

eners saw no point in hurting Truman to help Dewey, whose
rn.clal views were as bftd as Truman 1 s a.nd v1hosc party they
intensely disturbed.
their votes away'?

What could they a.ccomplisll by throwing

Thurmond found himself more a.ncl more

105

alone .
'l'ruman kept slashing \in til the end.
final

s~eech€s,

In one of his

he e xpressed that at first he wac puzzled

by Dewey•s refus al to discuss the issue s.

"But after I had

analyzed the situation, I cD,1tJe to the co uclusion tha.t the
106

record of the Republican l'arty is much too bad to talk about. "
The aft,ernoon of election doy Truman slipped

~way

to

Excelsior Sprinrs , t.Tissouri, where he bad a. Turkish bath and
then went to his room .

He had a ham sandwlch , a Glass of milk,
107

listened to some early returns, wGnt to bGd and went to sleep ..

-42chapter x

The Chi cago Tribune's headline on the morning of
November 3, 1948 read :

"Dewey Defeats Truman ."

Then ·

in their nationally syndicated column t hat day, the Alsop
brothers had written:

"Events will not wait patiently

unt i l Thomas E . Dewey offlcally replaces Harry

s.

Trurnan. 11

Howeve r , at 10 :30 A.M . eastern time the mornine aft Er
e l ection

"r

ds~y,

Dewey formally conceded .

am as much surprosed as you are.

de were all wrong together . "

He told thv press :

I have read your stories .

Later Dewey was to sa.y that

he felt like a man who woke up in a coffln wlth a li l ey in
his u1ani. and wondered .

" If I am alive, what am I doing here?

108

Amd if I ' m dead , why do I have to go to the b athroom? "
On it ' s f r ont page , the Washington Post invited the
President to a banquet attended by "political reporters ,
radi o commentators and columnists •. •.

The main course will

consist of breast of old crow en glace (You will eat

tur1~ey) ."

No major publicati on escaped without embarrassment , ar'ld one

109

by one they apologized to ole "Give ' em hell " Harry.
rhe general public , thouf!h they elected Harry , \vere

1

also amazed .

They too had read the newspapers and the polls.

The big question was, "How could all those experts be so
wrong? "

Truman liad held Dewey to a lower percentage of

popular vote ( 45 . 1~~ to Truman ' s 4 9. 61C) than Dewe y had t>e1 10

ceived in 1944 (46 . 03% ) against Roosevelt .
Moat political experts n.re convinced t ha t the Republican victory waa thrown avu:..y because of over reliance on

..

-43the polls .

Because of this Dewey's campaign strategy was

to give Truman the silent treatment.
h.-new the dt., ngers of an outspoken

Dewey and his staff

camp~:ti rn .

The poll l)re-

dlctions, giving Dewey a commanding lead, assured hlrn thut
a '1kkep silent" strategy would be safest.
plan of action robbed his

11

Dewey's fixed

overthouE•ht 11 ca111pal en of the

spontaneity, or1g1rJali ty and mobility which Truman enjoyed
b v playing the game by ear.

De\vey permitted a. Republican

Congeess which had motable accomplishments to be br·nded a
"do-nothing" Conp-ress; he allowecl Truman to brank the TaftHartley law as a

11

slave labor act 11 after Tl:'Uman himself had

urged tl1nt he be allowed t,o draft striking railroad workers;
Dewey let Truman t r lte credl t for high prices and hip:h wac:es
and yet blame t' e Republicans for not controlling inflation;
he d id not challenre Truman when he called a tax cut, which
relieved 7,400 , 000 from payinr taxes, a "rich man 1 s t a x biJ::l';
he let Truman blame the Republicans for a grain storage
shortage which was the fault of the Administration; he
completely sldppod the issues of ComulUnists in Governmer1 t,
and the arrors :nade by Truman • s men abroad in dea.ling with
Communism .

As a result, the Republicans remained apathetic

and overconfident; many simply clid not bother to vote .
Dewey inspired no one; in contrast, Dewey seemed dead while
111

Truman ,was not so efficient but very much alive .
For the pollsters, the shock of t he election linfered
after the disbelief had worn off.

Their humiliation tau r ht

them a lession they will never forret--take nothinr for
granted.

In his first post election report Elmo Roper said:

-4-'1·11

1 could not hcve been more wrong .

1'he thing t11at bothers
11 2
wrone: ~"

me most is that at thls moment I don't knww why I was

Truman had won a plurality of over 2,000,000 votes,
but a swinf! to Dewey of 30,000 votes, appropriately distri buted in Illinois , Ohio and California, would have e:iven
Dewey the Presidency .

Wallace had ·made a very poor showinr.:

getti nr only 1,1 57 , 326 votes.

However , he did cause Truman

tCJ lose New Yorl. , Maryland and .Michigan.

Thurmond had

received 38 electoral votes, 1 ,176,125 popular votes , from
four southern states--Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi
and South Carolina.

Hls 39th electoral vote ce.me form
11 3

a Democrat elector in Tennessee .
Truman's winninc coal i tion of states were vGry similar
to the clesign wade by Clifford in 1947.

The !'resident

t ook every Western state but Oregon, seven of the eleven
in the South, the four border ste.tes of Kentucky , Oklahoma ,
West Virginia and kissouri, five states in t he Midwest-Illinois, Iowa, Ohio ,

~ inn esota

and Wisconsin; his only

victories in the northeast were lvfassachusetts and Rhode
11 #

Island.
The voters who made up the successful coalition
from the same source e.s had F'DR 1 s SUJ)port.

c ~ me

Wben the p opular

vote is analyzed, it is found that Truman he ld most of the
South, ran wellin the urban North (here Wallace ctlt into
his vote) , successfully

c~ptured

theWest, and also hsd

great success in the Midwest farm belt, usually Republican
ground .

It had been widelh a f'r;umed that Roosevelt ' s coali

tion had b een

sh~ttered

Lecause of the Wallaceites and

TOTAL 1948 ?RESIDBNTIAL VOTE FOR DEWEY, TRUlv.iAN,
WALLACE, THURMOND AND OTHERS
Percentage of total vote
State

Total vote

Der,.rey

Truman

Wallace

Thurmond

Others

.7
1•9
.3
4.7
1 .2

79.7

.5

214,980
177,065
242,475
4,021 J 538
515,237

19 .o
43.8
21 .o
47.1
46.5

53.8
61 .8
47.6
51 .9

883,518
139 , 073
577,64-3
418,760
214, 816

49.5
50.0
33.6
18.3
4-7.3

47.9
48.8
48.8
60 .8
50 .0

2.0
.4
2 • ..I

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentu.cky

3,984,046
1 ,656, 214
1,038,264
788,819
822,658

49.2
49.6
47.6
53.6
41 • 5

50.1
48.8
50.3
44.6
56.7

.6
1 .2
.6
.2

Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan

416,326
264 ,787
596 '735
2' 155,347
~,109,609

17.5
56.7
49 .L~
42.2
49.2

32.7
42.3
48.0
53.4
1~7 .6

.7
.7
1 •7
1.8
2.2

~iinnesota

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Neb:baska

1,212,226
192' 190
1,578,628
224,278
488,939

39.9
2.6
41 .s
43.1
511.•2

57.2
10 .1
58.1
53.1
45.8

2 .3

Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Nexico
New York

62 , 117
231 ,440
1 ,949,555
185,767
6 ,27I.J- ~527

I.J-7 .3
52 .4.
50.3
43.2
1~5 .3

50.4
46.7
45.9
56.8
l.j.Lj .3

2.4
.9
2.2

North Carolina
North Dakota.
Oklahoma
Oregon

791,209
220 ,71 6
2 , 936 ,071
721 ,599
524,080

32.7
52.2
49.2
37.3
49.8

58.0
43.4
1~9 .5
62.7
46.4

.5
3.8
1. 3
2. 9

1 .o

Penns;rlvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

3,735,149
326,098
1L1-2, 57 1
250' 105
550,283

50,9

46.9
57.8
2/.j.• 1
47.0
49.1

1 .5

.7

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho

Oh i u

41 .4

3.8
51 .8
36.9

a

1 .6

.8

1

15 . 5
20.3

7,

•1

.3
3.3

.o
.4
.2

.4

.7
1 •1

1 •3

.9
1 .2
.3

49.1
.4

.3
.5
2.6
1 .o

87.2

.6
.1

.5
0

8.1

.8

.5
.4.5
.4

16.5

•1

1 .6

2.3
8.8
.2

.5

•1
1 •1

72.0

0

.3

13.4

.2

TOTAL 1948 PRESIDENTI4L VOTE FOR DErNEY, TRU¥~N,
~1ALLACE • THURI·WND A11) OTHERS_lContinued)
Percenta~e

State
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
washington
West Virginia.
Wisconsin
Wyomine:
United States

~otal

vote

1, 1l!·7 , 245

De,tr~Y

Truman

of total vote

Wallac~ Thurmond

276,305
123 , 382
419,256
905,059

24 .6
45.0
61 .5
41 .o
42.7

65,4
54· .o
36.9
47.9
52 . 6

.5
3.5

74.8 ,750
,800
101 ,L~25

42.2
46.3
47 . 3

57.3
50.7
51 .6

.4
2 .0
.9

48,833,680

45.0

49.4

2.4

1 '276

.3

1 .o

1 .o

Others

9 .3
10 . it

.3

.o

.5
.2

1 .2
1 .o

.2

2 .. 4

.9

Based on Statistics of .:t_he Presidential and Cong:vessional
Election of November 2, 19'48, compiled from ~ffioial sources by
William Graf unde · direction of Ralph R. Roberts, Clerl{ of the
House of Representatives (Government J?rinting Office, 1949 ) .
Taken from: Frederick Mosteller, Herbert Hyman, rhilip J.
McCartP,.y, Eli S. Marks, David B. Truman, eds . , ..TI:!2 P t~e - election
Folls of 1948, (New Yorkt: Social Science Res~a.rch Council, i 949),
p.

316-317.

Dixiecrats.

Actually these revolts strengthened Truman
Th~

as was shown in Sam Lu bell 1 s
itics.

Future of

Amceri~

The Dixiecrats siphoned off some votes, but

Polthey

also solidified support for Truman among certain groups of
traditionally Democratic voters.and lent credibility to
1 is·

civil rights programs .

Truman invulnerable to the

Henry Wallace's calllpalgn made
char~es

of belng too

11

aoft 11 on
115

communism .

This strengthened him among Catholic voters.

Still the ques tion,how had al l the experts been so
wrong?

Everybody's miste.lres, in the end , were attributed

to the polls.

One correspondent c onfessed :

" I was too

gutless to put stock in my, own personal hunch, based on
nothlne: better t''lan tours of the area, chats with businessmen,
union men , miners , ranchers, farmers, political leaders ."
He felt he couldn't pin down his hunch, so he followed the
trend shown by the yolls .

Local politlcal leaders relied

heavily on the polls, so when a reporter interviewed a local
leader, he often only picked up the informa tion obtained
rrom the polls the leader hnd read.
In another ins tance the Staley Millinr Company, a
Kansas City feed supplier , co!'ducted an informal poll among
1 t!s

customers by

havinr~

the farmers register their prefenence

by buying sacks of feed with either a yicture of a donkey
or an elephant on it.

In September , after 20,000 farmers

in six Midwestern st a tes
fifty-four percent for
"We

he~d

been . . . . oll ed , the reaul t was
to forty-six percent for Dewey.

Trt~an

read the Gallup and Roper .r: ol ls that 1t1ere all f or Dewey, 11

a company offical explained,
116

were too improbable, 11

11

and we decided that our results

THE FORECASTS OQIIIPARED wirH ELECTION RESULTS

Percentage of total presidential vote

Nati onal vote
Crossley
Gallup
Roper

Dewey

Truman

.12..J..

!!2.:..2

Thurmond
2.4

49 . 9
49 . 5
52 . 2

4Lf . 8
44 . 5
37.1

2 .0
5.2

1.6

ace
2 .4

Total~

3.3
4 .0
4.3

99 . 6
100 . 0
98 . 8

~/al l

_99 . 4

-ti•Exclusi ve of percente.ges for 111inor candidat..es. Gallup
percentage s calculated on total vote for four principal candidates .

STATE-BY- STATE ERRORS lN PREDlCTlON
Forecast percenta ge roinus election percentage
From - 12.0%
-10 . 0%
- 8.0%
- 6 . 0%

to
to
to
to
J.~ . O% to
2.0% to
0 %to
2.0% to
4 . 0% to
6 . 0% to

Number of state errors
i n Crossley predictions

-10 . 1%
- 8 . 1%
- 6. 1%
- 4. 1%

- 2 .1 %
- • t%
1. 9%

3.9%
5.9%
7. 9%

Total number of states forecast

2

4

5
13
12
7
2
0
1

Number of state errors
in Gallu p predictions
.lj

2
9

12
14
2
1

0

1

0
0

47

44

Talten from : FredericL Mosteller, Herbert Hyman , .?hilip J.
Eli S . Marks , David B. Truman, eds . , The Pre-election
:Polls of 1948 , (New Yorlc : Social Science Research Cour1cil, 1 949),
p . 298- 299 .

McOart~y ,

-46The p:ress were also mislead by the polls .

The report-

era were meticulous in re porting crowd turnouts but were
unwilling to de<.w conclusions which differed with the polls.
Thus the g reat cncwds which 'l'ruman. drew th e last. few weeks
of his c ampaign led almost no one to suspect that he might
win.

The crowds were attributed to the " entertainment value "
1 17

of see1n.v any President and his f amily .
Eight days after th e election , the Social Science
Rese a rch Council set UJ a committee to analyze where the
pollsters had

mt~ de

their mistake s .

The Gallup, Roper and

Crossley organizations alJ cooperated in the invest1vation.
The commi ttee issue d lt ' s report on December 27, 1948 , and
a ccording t o t he m the _gollsters made many errors .
( 1)

All three polls had not considered the possibil-

ity of a decisive swine: to Truman in thelast two weeks of
the campaign .
(2)

All three stppped polling too early .

Gallup's

final predict i on was based on samples taken ln mid- October;
Croasley•s final forecast waa b a sed ona comb1nation of
surveys from

mid-Au~ust ,

st ~ tA

mid- September and mid- October;

Roper ' s final estimat ion was fro m data he collected in
August from w'1ich he pr edict ed De,,.. ey 1 s victory by such a
mar gin thc t he discontinued periodic surveys,

(3)

All three assumed that the final staeoa of the

campaign would have nc significant lmpact on the votes .
Roper believed the entire dampaign was irrelevant .

The

absurdity of this a ssumption was shown when a post-election
survey showed that one out of every seven voters claimed to

-47have made up their minds within the last fourteen days of
the campaign ; three-quarte rs of these delayed decl s lons
favored Truman .
(4)

The polls contained errors in sampling and

lnterviewine techniques, which r esulted l n too few interviews with people of grade school education and thus an
underestimation of the Democratic vote.
After 1948 the poll takers became a more modest and
humble lot; their techniques improved considerably.

They

gained a renewed awareness of the unpredictability of both
l~ade rs~ip

in a democracy and of tb e choices that voters

make in the privacy of the votine booth .

Take nothing for
11 8

pranted--particularly th e American voter.
To further anal yze the election of
into consideration the

pe~sonalities

1 94~

we must ta ke

or the two major can-

Immediately after the Republican convention Dorothy

did ~t es .

Thom1-son noted tha t Dewey's successful C!J.Omlnation "represented
the success of pollticr l techniques and the
lution •• • •

~an agerial

revo-

Yet I had the impression by no means unique to

myself that if he had been

defe~ted

been pleased with themselves. 11

more people would ha ve

11 9

After the ele ction, J ames Roosevelt, Sta te Che.irman of
California , said,

11

didn't want Dewey . 11

lssues didn't matte

in

~94,8 .

The people

Abe Goff, defeat ed for re-election . in

Idaho , tells of five ftienda meeting the day after election,
each of whom voted for Truman because the :v didn't take to
Dewey.

Also the Democrats played up an example of Dewyy 's

pet time as , tel line· how Dewey toolt a. plane from LaGuardJ.a

-48Airport eight miles to Idlewild kir}Dort so t'1at he, lil.e
Truman, could arrive in a plane for the

ded~cation

ceremonies .

But Harry , in contrast, represented the backbone of
America--a common man.

He was a Lion,

~oose,

Elk, member

of the American Legion, V.F.W . , Order of Alpha, Society for
the Preservation of Barbershop Singing and a 33rd deerree
Mason .

He portrayed a picture of an underdog gallantly

fi ghting on against all

o~ds .

This kind of appeal r ates
12 1

second only t o the price of corn in its result.
"There were t hose--there are those--who say Harry

S. Trum "ln is an opportunistic and say lt t o mean that
he vrould ride anybody' s coat-tails to p:e t ahead.
This
may be; contrary to popular opinion, some politicians
a re smart enough to be opportunists and not lool{ lih.e
the opoula r opinion of what an opportunist looks like .
It may be that Harry S, Truman ' s great political invention has been to coldly, de liberatel y , always glve
the people what they need , and to hell with the spec ial
intere dts becau s e all the interests can give yo ~ is
money, whereas the p eopl e vot e . And Harry has never
~een interest ed in ~e ttin e money , except at a riduculously low wa5e per pound of effort expended, even
1tJhen he
needed it very badly for per - onal ree s Lns .
It may be that Harry Truman was open to be ing bougl1 t
in exchange for power at the polls. In a nati on where
the gov"n:'runen.t i ~ supposeJ tu be of , '.J,y , a.n d for t he
poeple, that's where th•:- power comes from. A st:ur'l.,Y of
Harry Truman ' s career leaves one with the conviction
(of) ho\'r much easier, more permanent, and more popular
Hurry ' s way 1 s . 11 122
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"One ca.ndida te s nys he oueht to be rresident because
hi s Vice Presidential candidate is better than anybo~
else's. O:nother sa.y1::1 tH.1 ou ght to be President because
he will run over any anarchist who lies down infromt
of his car. A third-by all odds the runaway f avorl te-hardly s ays anything substantial at all. "
This was campaign '68.

123

My name 1a
Richard Milhous Nixon
And I hope that you're
All fixin 1 to
Just tiptoe
Through the issues
With me.
Don ' t want to analyze,
I ' d r ather generalize
So please don ' t eriticize.
Simply close your eyes
And tiptoe
Through the issues
With me.
James Symington
This was the e s sence of the Republican campaign of
1960 .

To a nation nervous over the problems of war, civil

crime and violence , inflation-- Nixon vowed to " sock lt to 'em. "
However, this gave a misleading impres s ion as the triclcy
slogan masked the true mature of the Nixon game .

Nixon

set the pace of his campaign with mechanical efficiency using
unemotional drive to take Amer•ica by shrewd calculation .
Nixon wa s in the lead and playing it safe .
r epea t of

~he

He avoided a

debate a ebacle o£ 1960; he moved at a leisurel y

pace instea d of i n a mad swirl knowing that his exhaustion
124

caused him to make c ostly m_stakes in 1960 .
Nixon got his base of support in the small Northern
towns and among whi te :P:r·otestants .

Small town residents

- 50distressed over city conditions l ooked to Nixon for a
quie ting change as did the wealthier cuburban ite s ,

The

GOP base broadened somewhat in the under 35 and the collegeeducated vote .
p ~ rty

s ·ome of these moved fr.om the Democratic

in reaction to the Chi cago convention .
Nixon 1 s Dewey campaign strEo.tegy gathered in enough

diverse groups to elect a minorlty President.

Nixon dis-

played his abil ity to put a party and a succe s sful dampaign
together.

But we have no t yet seen if he has the

inne~

sources of mind and spirit that separates the skilled
125

technician from a memorable leader of men .

-51 ..
On the shores of the Potomac
By the gently Johnson Bombing
Stood the might Happy Worrier
"Crying Hubert," was his name.

It's been many years a fleeting
Since Hubert started fighting
Mayor Humphrey's still repeating
The messages of yore.

While his courage and his foresight
Enriched his climb to power
Lyndon Johnson with his own plight
Made Hubert's chances sour.

So let us not forget Horatio
Undergog that he be
As Smiling Hubert runs for President
Reminding both you and me.
J'erome Bork and Oloene Bigp-s
Wl th the desperation o1' the underdoe , Humphrey r an h1a
campai gn full steam ahe!:.d.

His basic tactic wa.s to give the

Refu blicans more "hell" than anyone since Harry Truman.

He

damned Nixon as "Fearless Fosdick" for cling i r1g to the law
and order issue and as "Richard t be Chickenhearted" for evading
debate.
With his party in chaos, his treasury all but empty and
prospects looking very bleak, Humphrey r e fused to give up.

-52In late September he dubbed himself ' 1the Lonesome

Ran~er "

a.nd he rode himself mercileesly in an effort to let the
people know t he real Hubert Humphrey.

By Humphrey's sheer

determination and zeal he managed to brin g a momentum to
127

his own drive that seemed impossible after the corJVention.
Humphrey's usually boyyant expression af.t en became
clouded with pain and confusion.

He could not comprehend

why, in view of hie necord, he was looked upon as a member
of a system that had proved unresponsive to the problems of
today.

He

~ad· always

been a liberal, but now, because of

his loyalty to his Pflesident, he was considered a member
of the party moderates.

Hubert was deeply grateful to

Johnson for al l the help Jo"•nson had given hilD in the Sen128

ate and later.
Humphrey had always been s cour a geous liberal.
mayor of Minneapolis, at tl1e

a ~· e

As

of 34, he had cleaned up

the police for ce, reduced cirme and aided schools.

He had

palced his political ca r e er on the line in 1948 wheq at the
Democrt tic Convention, he forced through a stronc cl vil
rights plank.

He had crusaded for Medicare 15 years before

it be came law; propsed a Peace Corps nine months berore it
was established; strove valiantly f or peace as was seen in
his struggle for ena.ctwent of the Nuclear Test Ban 'rreaty.
He failed t o see how people could not remember all of t his-129

the truth is he could n ot shak.e t he Johnson stigma .

.. 53Run them over
I'm the drover
And 1 will ma ke you free
If you agree with me.

Communist and Anarchist--Listen herel
Wallace will never fear
In front of his car you lie
And there you're gonna die!

Blaclr man io not crazy
He's just a little lazy
O~r

pure women he will li1rty
If ever

\<Te

give the chance.
Jerome .Borlt and Cloene Bi ggs

The band blared out "Dixie," and a knot of pwople closed
in around three silent black demonstrators yelling , "Kill
'er.o l

Kill 'eml 11

cheered,

b~t

The true believers waved rebel fla g s and

the man merely grinned and greeted his crowd.

"We not a sectional movement--we national!" h e shouted and
here in Madison Squa re Garden he had rarely been more
vincing.

con~

In very polite language, George Wallace ws s running

a caillpaign for President of the United Str tes filled with
rac i al prejudice, bigotry and pul;le h ate--hate for anyone·
different or who da red to disar ree.

And the s t unning fact

of this c ampaign autumn Wets tha t Wallace alone among the
130

candidates had really c&Pured the public's 1magin9t1on .

-54The domestic scene had been full of unrest and violence
for the last few ye~1 ra .

From " Communist inspired" student

anti-war demonstrations to actual violent racial disturbances
and a large number of Amer•icans were either sca red or angry,
They were looking f or a r a.dica l change v1h ich would t d{e
t J em back to the d ays when disturbances of' this ki nd were
not the rule

b~t

the exception.

Suspi cious, hate-filled,
131

reactionary Americans ha d fina l ly found a

l ~ad e r.

TOTAL 1968 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR
NIXON

I

RU.rvT.FHREY AND WALLACE

Percentage of total vote
State

Total vote

Humphrey

Nixon

Wallace

14

66

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

921 ) 197
20,176
376,325
258,692
6,231 ,693

14
43
35
31
46

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist Columb
Florida

795,378
1 ,259,529
211 ,413
166,069
1 ,874,077

42
50
42
82
30

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

907,410
178,447
267,368
3 , 580,231
1,970,052

26
58
31
45
38

29
56
46
50

45
1
13
8
12

lO\<Ta

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

1 '087 '733
765,796
955,277
1,066,065
360,289

4-1
35
38
29
56

53
55
4·4
23
43

6
10
18
48
2

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
lVlisslssi ppl

1 , 197,8 19
1,878,067
2,258,612
1 '461~ ' 01 4
620 , 386

43
63
49
54
23

42
32
41
42
14

15
5
10
5

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

1,567,776
163,751
441 ,683
133,332
279,345

45
44
33
40
44

44
49
59
47
52

11

New Jersey
New Mexico
Ne\1 York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Okhlloma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

2,761,718
309,365
6,632,250
1 '553, 577
190 '994

44
40
50
29
39
43
32
43
47
65

46
52
44
39
56
115
47
58
45

9
8
5
31
6
12
20
7

3,31.~8,785

859,065
608,965
3,946,910
370,393

1~7

10
9

50
28
47

11.1

51

7

45
18
40

13

1~4

1~1

31

7
6

30

61!

7

8
13
4

8

1.1

TOTAL 1968 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR
NIXON, HUMPHR1Y AND WALLACE (Continued)
Fercentar e of total vote
State

Total vote

South Carolina
South Dal~oto.
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Y./e st Virgirda
Wisconsin
Vlyoming
United States

*

Humphrey

N~xon

\'Tall ace

637 ,624·
221 ,009
1 • 180,371
2,527 ,076
418,773

29
40
28
42
36

39
51
38
40
57

32
9

156,736

44
33
48
50
44
36

53
43
48

3
24
7
7
8

56

9

43.4

43.7

1 ,330,434

878,748
716,955
1,656,679
100,800

63,639,236

L~5

Ll·l

31.1

19
6

12.9

Results tabulated before all the precincts were counted

Taken from: "Presidential Vote, 11 Arka.nsas Democra t,
November 6, 1968 .
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There e.re a number of similar1 ties existing in the
candidates, issues and

circums~ndes

idential campaigns of <1J.948 and 1968.

surrounding the Pres-

I am not sure if they

men made tho conditions or if the conditions made themen.
Richard Nixon ran tne same kind of campaign as dld
Thomas Dewey.

Nixon was not so confident as Dewey because

pollsters learned t heir lessions will in 1 91.~8, but h e still
had a com}:3ortable lead and ran hes campaign like a man who
was wit ning .

Nixon, as did Dewey, avoided

Ulal..~h g

a bit:;

is sue o1' the issues a d ran a ti ghtly efficient, wello~anized,

slig11tly boring campa i gn .

wi · ner, vith men were above
paigning.
1t

In -:- he position of

mud~lingi ng,

hard-hittlne cam-

Ne ithe r did much to e xcite t he public, blht played

safe and go t plenty ol' rest.

The important. dl. ffer e n ce is

the quality of advisors each man had wo r>ki · g for him.

De\o\·ey 1 s

men W01.lld htlVe been fine ii; t hey had cnly b Gen campaifl;nin6
in l a r ge ubban areas .

Howe,rE:r , tl1e a·IJs enee of anyone lmowled-

gable on the farming s ituation c ould very well be what cost
Dewey the election.
Nixon , on the other
didicated

me~,

hand~

had an excellent staff of

and he was covered inall areas vital to na-·

tional campai gning .

The one tl:h.in5 no one could do wt s e ove

vitality and genuine enthusiasm t _, t he t ype of campaign
Nlxon

w~

s waging .

Nl.xcn was saved by t h e

f~

ct U"'a t the

voters want ed a change f orm the Johnson-Humphrey line without

-56reverting all the way back to Wallace--the Neanderthal man .
Nixon was their only choice .
The 1968 counterpart to Thurmond and his Dixiecrat
Party w<-. s Geore;e C, 'llallace and his Amcrlcan Independent
Party .

Thur mond and the Dixiecrats bolted the r er;ular Dem-

ocratic Party because of tht stronr, civil rights planli in
the plafor m.

Thurmond, a moderate on the

not cam:aign out of the South .

r ~c ial

issue, did

He only received support

from four of the Southern states.

'l'he majori ty of Southerners 1

poll ticia.ns and voters alike, were not willing to endanger
the South's strong position in Congress just to f ight Harry
Truman .

Besides , Dewey was just as bad as Truman on r r ce,

and he was also a Republ i can.

Thurmond

war~ ed

a d r.: cent

campaign, but actually caused li •.tle excitement after the
in tial t hu rst was over, and tempers had t:l.me to cool.
WaJlace

a~d

another st.ory.

his American Independent Party were quite

George Wallace l ed his followers out of the

Democra$lic Party i n a
ri f'hts.

l'i~~ht

for racial purJ..t \ and strtes 1

He campai13ned vigorousl y andmanat:ed to e:et on the

ballot in all fifty states.

His

~essa ~ e

seemed to have a

~re at

deal of a ppeal for those vot ers who were scared of the Negro
revolution and

"Oo mmunlst- i n.~pired ' '

student derr.ons tra tions .

Wallace warcd a fire and brimstone campaign based on fear
and hate .

He lllanac ed to put some exci t ·c ment ln whctt maght

have otherwise been an even duller campalgn.

Wallace received

aro ,nd 13% of the national vote, c rrylng six Southe Y'n
states snd cutting into the blu.e-collar and white suburban
vote less taan expected.

But as lone as t11ei't' are people who

hate, Wallace will be around.again .

-5( d -

WH E R E

WA L L A C E

A M0 N G

T H I R D

1 9 6 8

I!!///1//I/A/I/~
AmPn1
.
I

RANKS

P AR T l E S

l

fHH1

1 9 4 8

m

1 9 2 4

Tnt'loY'I. L.,...floY'I +
~·

I
Dixiecr a t

///1//////}///////~
Ilrogres~

1 9 1 2

1 8 5 6

I

:

l/11/1!/l//},!/l////l/1111111~
~ull Moo §!~ 1
I
I

///////l//l,/////l/llltJ
Know-Nothinu.
0

I
10

-,

20

30

percentage of pupula r vote

Taken f rom:

Newsweek , November 11 , 1968 , p . 36 .

- 57flarry 'rruman and Hubert Humphrey were both forced to
wage Cl.<mpa.igna as the under{ioe;.
and everythine: to
campaie:n.

They had n othi n e t o lose

from a hard-hi ttine <~ gut-level

f!-c> ln

Truman traveled the n~tion

and letting the p eo1.:.le see him .
whippin ~

Congre s s as t he

11

whistlestopping 11

He used the Eir.h tieth

p ost tor all the ills of the nation,

und mana.t)'ed. to build some enthusiasm for his c ause .

Truman

was a genius when it came to unde rs tanding the p eople
and the ir needs.

He brou ght sympathy for h i mself by allow-

ing his speeched t o

ue

cut off for

l t:t c ~...

of funds.

.lme1·1cans

in Truman's t ime , loved n othing better than a co,umon man
unless it wa s an unde rdog--Harry \1'/as both.

No one belelved

he could !.'ossi Lily win, ar1d it Has a lonely can1pa i r;n .
Harry had some defi n ite
he

\laS

the Pr e sident.

advanta~es --one bei ~n

the

However,

fac~

that

This e abled him to ge t publicity,

free, anytime he Y.rant ed it, since anythint! the .Presid ent
says io news.

Truman

Wt,! S

p robab l y not dr a stically b ehind

Dewey .for very lqng, even thoueh the p oll s showed t hat h e
was .

In 1948 e ver yone wa s c onvinced early i n the year that

Truman did not. lw ve a chance .

'l'he p ollsters , new smen and

political experts had all reached a cor clusion and then proceeded t o gather evidence t o support

the ~r

conclusion.

They had predicted so loudly for so l one t h::Jt Tru man could
not wln, so that when evidence began to filter in

indicati n~

that the tide had cha.ne:ed, it was i gnored .
The pollsters would never arain repeat tl-).e mis take of
1 g L~8.

Therefore, in 1968 when it •: tas indi cated that Hunrphrey

would lose the y were correct.

George Gallup stated

t~Lt

-58it was possible for him to pull an upset comparable to
Harry 'r:r·uman ' a .
out of
him .

11

Nixon had peaked too soon and had run

half-i s·~ues,"

a gre &t many people were tired of

Dr. Gallup siad, "Humphrey · 'probably' would have

won if the election had been u fe1N days later."
Humphrey had to contend vii th a much stronger thlrd
party than did Truman, but mainly Humphrey had to contend
with discontent.

The advanced news media has given the

American people a chance to see the intricucie s of their
political system at work.

Seeinl! the fiasco at :t:he Demo-

cratic Convention this year probably hurt Humphrey badly
especially the youneer more idealistic v cters .
Humphrey made a stronr. oush toward the end .
pave up.

The

sti[~ma.

He never

of the Johnson ao.mir:istra tion was a

handicap he could not ove rcOJ.ue .

l?erhaps t he big d ifference

ln the result ot the t 'rto elections is that Truman was already 1 ~"'esiL~ ent- - his own manj and Humphrey was not) and seemed
unable to convince the voters that
"captain

11

of the team.

he ever co uld Le the

THE POLLSTERS VS. THE VOTERS

1968
Actual Vote

Gallup
election eve

Gallup
Oct . 27

Harris
election eve

Harris
Oct . 18

NIXON

43.7%

42%

4·4%

40%

40%

HUMPHREY

43.3%

40%

36%

43%

35%

WALLA CE

13 .0%

14t~

15%

13%

H.l%

OTHERS OR
UNDECIDED

4 "/
/<!

Taken from:

5%

4%

7%

Newsweek , November 11, 1968, p . 35.
News & World Re port, November 4, 1968 ,
p . hi .

u.s.

- ')-,) h

1948 ELECTION
-Party StrenethVoters Calling Themselves

Per Cent

Estimated No .

Democrats
Republicans
Independents
Other· Party

35

45

22,000,000
17 , 000,000
9,500,000
500 , 000

19
1

-Actual Voting Per Cent
Truman
Dewey
States' Rights
Progressive

49 . 9

45 . 3
2 .4
2.4

Votes Cas t
24,179 , 623
21 '991 ,290
1 , 176 J 1 5.lf1 , 1 57,326

Taken from: John M. Fenton , In Your Opinion . •• , (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company , 1960), p . 63 .
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VOTERS PUT NIXON ON THE

MAP
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